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In order to halve current carbon emissions, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates 
that, globally, US$45 trillion needs to be invested in renewable energy by 2050. This equates 
to a little over US$1 trillion per year on average; in 2010 global investment in renewable 
energy reached a record high of US$243 billion (UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
2011), roughly a quarter of what is needed.  
While halving global emissions seems a daunting task, it is at the bottom of the range of what 
is required. In order to have a reasonable chance of keeping temperature increases below 
2°C–2.4°C – the level beyond which scientists fear that feedback mechanisms could be 
triggered – the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) estimates that global 
emissions need to fall by between 50% and 85% by 2050. We are nowhere near on track to 
achieve this; global emissions would need to peak by 2015 and decline rapidly thereafter, but 
are still increasing at an accelerating rate. If current trends continue, the United Nations 
estimates that global temperatures could increase by more than 6°C over the course of the 
century, which is far beyond levels that human civilisation has ever experienced (Hansen et 
al., 2008). 
The situation is thus challenging to say the least. Of the estimated US$1 trillion of annual 
investment required, around half is needed for energy efficiency or to replace existing 
technologies (e.g. fossil fuel-based with renewable energy systems). Much of this is in the 
developed world, but US$530 billion per year is needed for newly installed capacity, mainly in 
developing economies. It is estimated that 85% of this total investment will need to come from 
private sources (IEA, 2009).  
While this is daunting, particularly the target for private investment, it is not impossible. 
Annual fossil-fuel subsidies, for example, are around US$300 billion per year, which means 
that US$530 billion of investment in 2030 would represent only 3% of global investment.  
Although many felt that the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen in 2009 
was a disaster, COP16 held in Cancún in 2010 gave grounds for more optimism about the 
possibility of reaching a global deal. Also, despite the difficulties in the intergovernmental 
negotiations, neither the financial crisis and recession, nor the failure at Copenhagen, was able 
to derail investment growth – global investments in renewable energy reached record levels in 
2010. We remain well short of where we need to be, but investment is growing rapidly, and a 
range of incentivising instruments have been employed to support this investment. We now 
have a clearer understanding of the potential and limits of such instruments, and a range of 
proposals has emerged to fill gaps or address weaknesses in the current portfolio of tools 
available to policy-makers. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the instruments we currently have, and to consider 
those that have been proposed but not yet fully employed. To do this, however, we need to 
understand why such instruments are needed in the first place, or, to put it another way, why 
investment is not already flowing to the extent required. Section 2 then reviews mechanisms 
in the light of this, while Section 3 considers international transfer mechanisms and concludes. 
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1 Why is private renewable energy investment 
insufficient? 
Before considering how private investment could be increased to the extent needed we need to 
understand the current obstacles. These can be organised into three categories: 
1. The economics of renewable energy 
2. The supply of finance 
3. Uncertainty and risk 
1.1 The economics of renewable energy 
First and most fundamentally, the economics of renewable energy are generally not 
competitive, as production costs per unit of energy are usually higher than for fossil fuels.  
Figure1.1 Relative costs for renewable energy technologies compared with each 
other, and with non-renewable energy 
 
Source: IPCC, 2011 
Figure 1.1 shows relative costs for renewable energy technologies compared with each other, 
and with non-renewable energy. As we can see, non-renewable costs are in the range of 
US$0.3–US$0.10/KwH, while most renewable forms are more expensive and have a far 
greater cost range. In part, this reflects the relative maturity of technologies, but the 
significant cost difference of renewable energy production (depending on factors such as wind 
speed and degrees of solar intensity) is also a major factor. Finally there is a matter of scale: 
fossil-fuel technologies have been developed, improved and manufactured on an increasing 
scale for a century, which is not the case for the renewable sector.  
All of these factors suggest scope to reduce renewable production costs. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
however, this varies considerably by sector. The most expensive is ‘ocean’ (or tidal) electricity, 
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which, even at the bottom of the potential cost range, remains uncompetitive with fossil fuels. 
The next is solar power. At its cheapest, it is potentially competitive with fossil fuels, but mid-
range costs are well above fossil fuels. For solar power, the wide range reflects the cost 
implications of different technologies. For example, large-scale Concentrated Solar Power 
(CSP) techniques employed in a desert environment could produce electricity at a far lower 
cost than small solar panels fitted to residential properties. Wind power is potentially cheaper 
still, but remains more expensive than fossil fuels in most instances. Again, the range reflects 
differing scales of energy generation, but also the different cost structures of onshore and 
offshore wind. Finally, biomass, geothermal and hydropower in particular are already 
competitive with fossil fuels in some circumstances (IPCC, 2011). 
In addition to the absolute costs of renewable energy production, costs relative to fossil fuels 
are also important. Three points should be stressed. First, fossil-fuel energy does not reflect its 
full social costs. In 2006, the Stern Review described climate change as the ‘biggest market 
failure in history’ as the environmental costs associated with carbon emissions are not included 
in market prices (Stern, 2006). Not only are these externalities not reflected in prices, but 
fossil fuels are actually subsidised to the tune of US$300 billion per year. Removing these 
subsidies and incorporating external costs into non-renewable energy costs would dramatically 
change relative costs. For the latter, carbon taxes would be ideal, but if that is not feasible 
politically, it may be desirable to add a shadow price of carbon to evaluations of energy 
projects by public agencies (see below, and also Griffith-Jones and Tyson, 2011 for European 
Investment Bank (EIB) experience on this). 
Second, it is more expensive to deliver non-renewable energy in some places than others. For 
example, rural communities in developing countries are often not connected to grids, so that 
localised, ‘off-grid’ energy production – particularly solar power – is more competitive than in a 
fully networked context. 
Third, as shown in the Figure 1.2, there is no shortage of renewable energy potential at the 
global level. In terms of primary energy, it is already technically possible to generate many 
multiples of global energy supply using solar energy. Similarly, there is ample wind or 
geothermal power to meet all of today’s global electricity demand. 
Figure 1.2 Ranges of global technical potentials of RE sources 
 
Source: IPCC, 2011 
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Perhaps more importantly, much of this global solar power potential is concentrated in 
developing countries, but there is also high potential in other areas.  
Table 1.1 Top ten countries globally in terms of renewable energy potential relative 
to energy use 
Table 1.1 lists the top ten countries globally in terms of 
renewable energy potential relative to energy use. That they 
are all developing countries is partly a reflection of their 
relatively low energy use at present, but also the relative 
abundance of solar, wind, hydro and geothermal energy.  
It is therefore clear that there is significant scope to increase 
the use of renewable energy in developing countries. This is 
not limitless, however. Although we can expect the costs of 
renewable energy to continue to fall relative to fossil fuels, 
particularly in countries with high renewable energy potential, 
fossil fuels are likely to retain a cost advantage in most cases.  
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the 
basic economics of renewable energy need to be artificially 
altered, either by increasing the cost of fossil fuel-based 
energy (e.g. through taxes or equivalent mechanisms), or by 
reducing the costs of renewable energy (e.g. subsidies), or by boosting the returns to 
renewable energies (e.g. through paying a premium for this form of energy). 
Second, it does not follow that developing countries should be required to meet these costs. 
Where it is the case that employing renewable technologies makes economic sense, this is not 
an issue – only limited incentives are needed and it is reasonable to expect them to be met 
domestically because of the benefits that will accrue to the country. However, where the 
development of renewable energy capacity could place countries at a competitive disadvantage 
and/or these countries bear no responsibility for climate change, the costs should be met by 
countries that do bear such a responsibility. This case is even stronger while developed 
countries are subsidising fossil-fuel energy. 
This suggests that, in most cases, low-income countries (LICs) should generally not be 
expected to subsidise the development of a renewable energy sector. Significant implications 
result from this, which we shall return to throughout this paper. 
  
Years of Potential 
Energy Use 








C. African Rep. 13.92 
Guyana 11.10 
Source: Buys et al. (2007) 
Financing renewable energy in developing countries: mechanisms and responsibilities 
12 
 
1.2 The supply of finance 
Despite the issues described in the previous section, renewable energy investment (i.e. total 
private and public investment) has increased six-fold in as many years, from US$41 billion in 
2004 to US$268 billion in 2010. 
Figure 1.3 Global Renewable Energy Investment, 2004-10 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
Furthermore, after dominating global investment for years, developed economies have now 
been surpassed by investment in renewable energy in the developing world. 
Figure 1.4 Developed vs. Developing Country Renewable Energy Investment 
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While all developing regions have seen rapid growth, total volume figures are dominated by 
Brazil, India, and particularly China, as shown in Figure 1.5. 
Figure 1.5 Share of Developing Countries’ Renewable Energy Investments 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
Figure 1.5 shows that China accounted for almost 70% of total developing country investment 
in 2009 and 2010. Brazil had the next largest share at around 10%, while India only accounted 
for around 5%, as did Africa in 2010. 
Although Figure 1.5 shows a steady decline in India’s share, in absolute terms Indian 
investment tripled over the period. At the same time Brazil’s renewable investment grew 17 
times, while China experienced a 33-fold increase in investment. By 2010, Chinese investment 
in renewable energy was by far the largest in the world, almost as much as Europe and the 
USA combined.  
In Africa, investment in renewable energy has displayed a rather different pattern. Between 
2004 and 2009 it grew from US$300 million to US$700 million, which was only 1% of 
developing country investment at that point. In 2010, however, investment leapt to $3.6 
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Figure 1.6 Global Renewable Investment by Sector, 2004-09 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
Globally, wind power captures the largest share of global investments, reaching 66% in 2010. 
The next largest sector is solar, with a little over 18%. When we compare developed and 
developing countries’ sectorial investment in Figure 1.7 below, we see the dominance of wind 
power was even more pronounced for developing countries in 2010. This is almost entirely 
accounted for by the huge increase in Chinese investment in large-scale wind-farms.  
Figure 1.7 Developing vs. Developed Sectoral Investment 2010 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
It is interesting to note that developed countries’ investment in solar energy was more than 
double that of developing countries, particularly given the much higher concentration of solar 
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Figure 1.8 Renewable Investment forms 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
Figure 1.8 above illustrates the three main forms of investment: technology (including 
research and development (R&D) and venture capital); equipment (e.g. expansion capital from 
private equity funds or public markets); and projects (i.e. new renewable energy facilities). As 
can be seen, it is the latter which accounts for the majority of investment. The line on the 
chart shows that this in turn is dominated by the asset financing of large facilities, compared to 
small distributed capacity (e.g. residential solar capacity). 
The numbers for total investment and investment growth are impressive. Despite the setback 
at Copenhagen, and the global financial crisis, investment in renewable energy has continued 
to grow globally.  
However, there are important caveats. First, China is crucial to this story, representing a third 
of all new investment in 2010. Second, renewable energy investments have been supported 
globally by significant public support as part of the post-crisis stimulus packages in many 
countries. 
Figure 1.9 Support for Renewable Investments in Post-Crisis Stimulus Packages 
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Due to lags in disbursing these public funds, 2010 saw a very large influx of almost US$75 
billion, representing a significant proportion of total investment. Despite this support, however, 
investment in Europe fell from a peak of US$47.2 billion in 2008 to US$35.2 billion in 2010. 
The corresponding figures for North America were US$32.3 billion and £30.1 billion. It is the 
increase in Chinese investment, from US$23.9 billion in 2008 to US$48.9 billion in 2010, which 
has driven the global growth figures.  
Part of China’s investment growth relates to its stimulus package but it is also a continuation 
of high levels of ongoing investment, which cannot be described as ‘private’: 
The source of funds for Chinese projects varied, but rarely came from Western financial 
institutions. Quite often, state-owned or partially state-owned companies put up the 
capital. A typical example was a 201mW wind project financed with US$ 295.3 million in 
November by China Guangdong Nuclear Wind Power Co., a subsidiary of state-owned 
China Guangdong Nuclear Power. (WEF, 2011: 13) 
In the USA and EU, private investment remains dependent on state support, reflecting the 
basic economics described in the previous section. For a variety of reasons, not least the 
economic turmoil in the eurozone,1 a number of European countries are reducing their support 
for renewable investment. In the USA, investment was supported by stimulus support that 
allowed investors to claim back up to 30% of the CAPEX of projects in the form of grants. 
Investment in the USA could thus be constrained by government spending cuts over the next 
decade. This trend may have negative implications for investment in renewables (public but 
also private), not just in developed but also in developing countries.  
In terms of costs relative to fossil fuels, onshore2 wind remains the most competitive form of 
renewable energy. In the most favourable locations, it is now on a par with or cheaper than 
coal, but can still not compete with gas-fired power stations due to the low cost of natural gas. 
This in large part explains the surge in wind investment in recent years, but this has still not 
been enough to attract investment on purely commercial terms in many instances: 
One of the largest wind projects to secure funding last year was the 845mW Shepherds 
Flat wind farm being built by closely-held Caithness Energy of the US, in Oregon. It 
closed a $1.3 billion loan from a group of 26 institutional investors and commercial 
banks led by Citigroup, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, RBS Securities and West LB 
Securities. The loan carries an 80% guarantee from the US Department of 
Energy, supported by stimulus funding. [Emphasis added] (UNEP and Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance, 2011: 41) 
As well as the time-limited nature of these programmes, underlying demand in the USA is 
falling as many states get close to fulfilling their Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which 
require them to supply a certain amount of energy from renewable standards. Perhaps most 
fundamentally, the failure to pass supportive legislation – notably the cap and trade bill – in 
the USA has further undermined appetite for risk of long-term investors. These factors were 
reflected in market pessimism, where clean energy stocks underperformed the market by 20% 
in 2010 (UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011). 
The dependence on public support of US firms has been starkly demonstrated by the filing for 
bankruptcy of two major solar power companies. Following Evergreen Solar’s bankruptcy 
announcement in July 2011, August saw Solyndra announce that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process was underway. The company had received US$527 million of taxpayer support as part 
of the stimulus, as well as US$1 billion of private investment. In the context of concerns that 
US companies are losing out to China in the renewable energy sector, Congressman Henry 




 Information available at: http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/07/29/29climatewire-europe-slashes-low-carbon-
energy-subsidies-a-61653.html?pagewanted=1  
2
 Offshore wind is a much less mature technology, with considerable technical challenges, and remains considerably 
more expensive than onshore.  
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...are unfortunate warnings that the United States is in danger of losing its leadership 
position in the clean energy economy of the future. We should be doing everything 
possible to ensure the US does not cede the renewable energy market to China and 
other countries.3 
China is by far the biggest of the ‘big three’ developing country investors, and has focused 
increasingly on wind power in recent years. At a much smaller scale, India has also focused on 
wind power, while Brazil has seen investment in wind at the same level as that of biofuels.  
Excluding Brazil, Latin America saw a sharp increase in investment, with much of this focused 
in the Mexican wind sector, and driven by the government decision in 2009 to raise its target 
for total renewable capacity from 3.3% to 7.6% of total energy supplies. The other countries 
that saw rapid growth shown in Figure 1.10 below also benefited from government targets for 
renewable energy, and in many instances significant non-commercial funding and support, 
both domestic and from external sources. 
Figure 1.10 Renewable Investment in Latin America ex Brazil, 2010 (US$ billions) 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
In Asia (excluding China and India) renewable investment grew by a little over 30%, largely 
due to rapid growth in Pakistan (mainly wind power) and Thailand (mainly solar). As in Latin 





 Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/china-moves-in-on-western-solar-power-
industries-2347791.html 
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Figure 1.11 Renewable Investment in Africa 2010 (US$ Billions) 
 
Source: UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011 
As described above, in 2010 investment in renewable energy grew more rapidly in Africa than 
anywhere else in the world. This was partly due to the very low rates prior to this, and 
investment was dominated by Egypt and Kenya (see Figure 1.11 above). Investment in Egypt 
rose to US$1.3 billion as the result of two very large projects, one solar (thermal) and one 
wind power. The same level of investment was achieved in Kenya in a more diversified way, 
with wind, geothermal, small hydro and biofuel capacity all seeing significant investment 
(UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011). 
To an even greater extent than in other developing regions, non-commercial funding was 
central to investments in Africa. The role of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)4 has been 
particularly important, with the European Investment Bank (EIB) providing an interesting 
example. In Europe, EIB lending for renewables is part of its action to help the EU achieve its 
energy and climate change targets by 2020, and EIB lending for renewable energy has grown 
dramatically in the last few years, reaching € 6.2 billion in 2010. In addition, in 2010 the EIB 
provided € 2 billion to non-EU countries to support action on climate change, of which an 
important part was for financing renewables, as a first step in its three-year plan to increase 
its backing for green energy projects beyond its borders. The EIB is increasing further its 
resources for investment in renewables in developing countries through its Energy 
Sustainability Facility as well as its recently approved € 2 billion additional climate-change 
mandate for developing countries. An example of a major EIB project in renewables in a 
developing country is its investment (jointly with the African Development Bank) in a major 
onshore wind project in Cape Verde for € 45 million. This will provide a large amount of 
essential electricity-generating capacity as well as establishing wind energy as a reliable source 
of non-polluting renewable power in Cape Verde. The share of renewable lending in the overall 
EIB portfolio grew from less than 10% in 2006 to 34% in 2010 (EIB Annual Reports). The EIB 




 Here we define Development Finance Institutions broadly. As well as bilateral and multilateral agencies (e.g. CDC in 
the UK or the IFC respectively), we include Multilateral and Regional Development Banks (e.g. the World Bank and 
African Development Bank) in this definition.  
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facilitate connections of renewable energy into the main European grid (Griffith-Jones and 
Tyson, 2011). 
According to the EIB Annual Reports, its lending to developing countries includes a high 
proportion of environmental and sustainable projects, with 33% of its financing relating to this 
area in 2010. As well as direct financing, the EIB is engaged closely with developing countries 
in providing technical assistance and technology transfer, adapting technology developed in its 
projects in Europe. For example, solar power technology developed in Spain has been 
transferred to Morocco (Source: Interviews). 
An interesting feature of EIB projects is that they are subject to appraisals of environmental 
and sustainability standards as part of the initial and ongoing project cycle. In addition, applied 
technology is also always required by the EIB to be the best available from the perspective of 
climate action. Project assessment includes a required economic rate of return which accounts 
for the shadow cost of carbon which, for the EIB in 2020 will reach at least € 40 a tonne, rising 
gradually from € 26 a tonne in 2006 (with a possible upward revision being studied). This 
economic rate of return evaluation is undertaken in parallel to a purely financial rate of return 
using market prices.  
The EIB has developed a pioneering evaluation of all large projects to estimate net carbon 
footprints. The absolute carbon footprint of a project is compared with a baseline which reflects 
carbon emissions in absence of the project. Then a net carbon impact of projects is calculated, 
using advanced models including industry-specific ones, for example for roads or shipping.  
Appraising the economic rate of return, as described above, builds on the work of Little and 
Mirrlees, which was widely used in the 1960s to evaluate projects with shadow prices that took 
account of externalities. Such exercises are rarely done in other institutions. Just as important, 
the EIB is mandated to fully incorporate environmental and social factors into its decision-
making5 and – crucially – is not required to make a market-level rate of return, though it is 
supposed to break even.6 
According to interviews carried out at the EIB, the calculation of an economic rate of return 
(that takes account of a shadow price of carbon) has been particularly effective in promoting 
projects in renewable energy that it otherwise might not have been financed, such as solar 
energy projects in developing countries. However, it seems that this methodology has been 
less valuable for discouraging projects with high carbon emissions. Nevertheless, the fact that 
this economic evaluation is carried out, and that the EIB is committed to minimising the carbon 
footprint of its projects more broadly, has had an impact on private and public project 
proposals seeking EIB financing (interview material).  
Another important aspect of EIB lending is that, in the context of significant externalities, it 
can provide concessional lending (and finance the concessional element with EU grants) or co-
finance its non-concessional lending with EU grants to fund renewable energy projects. The 
availability of large EU grants, and close collaboration between the EIB and the European 
Commission, makes this difficult to replicate exactly in other institutions. Even so, the use of 
global environmental fund financing could be combined further with other DFI lending. 
Furthermore, the challenge of allocating relatively scarce public resources most effectively to 
different blending modalities, so as to maximise their impact on reducing climate change, is 
common to all institutions. 
As we saw in the previous section, the circumstances of many developing countries, 
particularly in rural areas, alters the economics of some low-carbon technologies. In its 2011 
review of investment in renewable energy UNEP makes this point in a review of examples of 




 See IIED (2011) for an analysis of different global investment principles and how the EIB’s approach differs from 
other bodies in this respect.  
6
 See Spratt and Ryan-Collins (forthcoming) for an analysis of how DFI mandates can affect their approach to these 
issues, particularly with respect to the relative weight given to commercial and non-commercial factors.  




In an increasing number of cases, renewable energy is not just one of the easiest non-
grid-connected options to establish, but also more cost-effective than the fossil fuel 
alternatives. This trend has led to speculation that developing economies may be able 
to ‘leapfrog’ developed countries in their use of renewable energy over the coming 
decade. (UNEP and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2011: 54) 
Examples of renewable energy options in developing countries are: 
 Generating energy in off-grid, rural power plants using discarded rice husks 
 Cooking at scale with solar energy (‘The world’s largest solar cooking system – 
which churns out 50,000 meals a day – is installed at the temple of Shirdi in India’s 
Maharashtra state’. Ibid: 56) 
 Powering mobile telephone masts using solar power 
 Converting waste to energy 
 Processing foods (e.g. dehydrating fresh fruits) with solar power 
 
We could also add hydropower and geothermal energy to this list. As argued above, it is 
important to distinguish approaches such as these, which make economic and social sense for 
LICs, from those that may adversely affect their economic development, even though 
environmental effects may be positive.  
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1.3 Uncertainty and risk 
In reality, the preceding sections have addressed the same issues from different perspectives. 
The economics of renewable energy have not been sufficiently favourable to attract private 
investment on the scale required. As we saw in Section 1.2 this has led governments – to a 
greater or lesser extent and in different ways – to provide financial support to the sector in a 
variety of forms. 
In part this is a matter of relative cost and revenues. Where costs are higher than with fossil 
fuels, as is generally the case, the return on investment will be lower. This can be offset in one 
of two ways – either by subsidising costs (through fiscal incentives or grants, for example), or 
by boosting returns directly (paying a premium for energy generated from renewable sources, 
for example). 
Figure 1.12 Risk List – Average Probability and Severity Scales 
 
Source: Parhelion Underwriting Ltd. 
A complementary way of looking at the problem is through the lens of risk. An in-depth survey 
of private investors, by underwriters Parhelion and Standard & Poor’s (2010), provides an 
interesting insight into the range of issues this encompasses.  
Figure 1.12 organises risks into four categories:  
a. Policy risk (squares)  
b. Capacity risk (diamonds)  
c. Transactional risk (circles)  
d. Project risk (triangles)  
Distributed across the chart, according to perceived probability and severity, forms of risks in 
the top right quadrant (A) are those of most concern to investors. These are as follows: 
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a. Maturity mismatch  
...investors are most concerned with the apparent mismatch between the long-term 
nature of capital commitments inherent in climate change financing and the relatively 
short time frame of climate change regulations. Investment horizons and/or capital 
commitment periods can range from 20 years for a reasonably sized renewable energy 
project to 50 years or more for a climate change adaptation-related investment. 
(Parhelion Underwriting Ltd and Standard & Poor’s, 2010: 5) 
The primary concern with ‘climate change regulations’ appears to be that government 
interventions to alter the economics of the sector (such as through feed-in tariffs, for example) 
are not commensurate with the investment timeframes in the infrastructure sector.  
b. Risk/Reward imbalance 
The second most severe risk is the same concern in a slightly different guise. For investors, the 
risks involved in renewable energy may be very high. Given the timeframes involved and the 
level of capital required, all infrastructure investment is risky, and infrastructure investment in 
low-income/high-risk countries is particularly so. Given the need to maintain favourable 
economics (often artificially) in the renewable energy sector, the risks are considerably higher.  
As a result, investors feel that they should be well compensated for taking these risks, and the 
concern is that over the lifetime of a project this will not be the case. When considering 
investments across a range of asset classes with different risk/reward ratios, renewable energy 
may seem a relatively unattractive form of investment.  
c. Transaction cost risk 
This risk is essentially a function of all the others. Investors fear that addressing the 
complexities of renewable energy projects will be time-consuming and expensive, creating 
significant transaction costs. This will also affect the risk/reward ratio negatively of course.  
d. Human and operational risk 
This concern partly reflects the immaturity of the sector and so its lack of established best 
practice. For example, projects may be dependent upon the delivery of climate finance support 
– through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), for example – but there is little 
accumulated expertise in managing this process. Similarly, from a technological and 
engineering perspective, facilities are often at the forefront of innovation, so that ‘best 
practice’ does not really apply and ‘learning by doing’ is more the order of the day. Such risk 
factors make investors very nervous, which is not surprising given the capital investments 
involved.  
Technically, the problem is the inability to measure the risks with any degree of accuracy, 
which means they cannot be appropriately priced.  
e. Economic/Commodity price volatility 
This factor captures a number of concerns. First, the costs of fossil fuels have a large impact 
on the relative returns of renewable energy. As a result, movements in global oil and natural 
gas prices can fundamentally affect the relative economic attractiveness of a project.  
Second, economic volatility (i.e. crises, recessions) are likely to influence the economics of 
investment, through changing government priorities and their capacity and willingness to 
maintain a supportive environment for the investment.  
Third, the viability of renewable energy projects is fundamentally affected by current and 
future carbon prices. To the extent that fossil-fuel prices reflect the environmental costs of 
climate change, the higher the carbon price the more attractive will be renewable energy 
projects. Besides the average price of oil and gas (and thus carbon), there is the issue of both 
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its short-and medium-term volatility, which impinges on the relative profitability of 
renewables.  
f. Policy risk 
A common element of many of these forms of risk is uncertainty about policy. If a project only 
makes sense when policy is being used to alter the underling economics, the risk is that this 
will not be maintained for long enough. This can be called policy risk, which is a major obstacle 
to accelerating investment in renewable energy production, particularly as it is likely to be 
necessary to maintain policy support for long periods given the timeframes of renewable 
energy facilities. 
A change of government can bring a change of policy, creating uncertainty. Also, economic 
volatility may rise, potentially reducing a government’s ability to maintain support even if it 
wished to do so.  
As well as this national policy risk, uncertainty over global policy remains high, reflecting the 
difficulties in reaching agreement at the intergovernmental level. Many believe that a global 
deal to restrict, reduce and allocate carbon-emission rights is an essential precondition for 
halting the process of climate change. Such a deal would create and maintain demand for 
‘carbon credits’, as countries sought to meet their emission-reduction targets in a variety of 
ways, including the purchase of credits for reductions made elsewhere. In the absence of such 
a framework, the supply of carbon credits outstrips the demand for them, and the ‘price’ of 
carbon is far lower than it otherwise would have been. A high carbon price would be the most 
effective way to alter the economics of renewable energy, and thereby create sufficient 
incentives for investment in the sector.  
The European Trading System (ETS) remains operational and is moving to its next phase. But 
the anticipated US version looks dead in the water. As a result, hopes of a global carbon-
trading system that would support and drive up the price of carbon – and so fundamentally 
improve the economics of low-carbon investment – also appear dead, at least for now. More 
limited schemes, for instance among European countries joined by others, could be an 
intermediate step. 
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2 Financial mechanisms 
2.1 Mechanisms to alter the economics of renewable energy 
In this section we will explore different mechanisms to alter the economics of renewable 
energy and encourage investment by the private sector. Two issues dominate. First, measures 
have to be strong enough to incentivise significant additional investment in renewables. 
Second, associated costs to governments and other public bodies must be manageable and no 
greater than required to provide these incentives, and must clearly be less than the level of 
expected benefits. As well as direct and immediate costs, these need to include any contingent 
liabilities in the future, as could be the case with unfunded guarantees, for example.  
The key ‘value for money’ criterion is the effectiveness of public spending in generating 
additional private investment (the leverage ratio), as well as the size of positive spillover 
effects. There is always the option of direct public investment in renewables, either financed by 
governments or by international organisations, and this needs to be compared with the 
leveraging of private investment financed by public resources, in terms of effectiveness. 
2.1.1 Raise the costs of fossil fuels 
The fact that the environmental damage caused by the burning of fossil fuels is not factored 
into their price is a clear example of a negative externality. The concept of an externality is 
attributable to Pigou (1932), and occurs when private costs are lower than social costs. In such 
a situation, private actors will produce more of a good than is socially optimal because they 
capture all the returns but do not bear all the costs, a share of which are ‘externalised’. By 
raising costs to producers or consumers,7 Pigouvian taxes aim to align private and social costs, 
and so maintain production at socially (including environmentally) optimal levels. From a ‘value 
for money’ perspective, an attractive feature of fiscal incentives is that they have the potential 
to be self-financing. 
There are three forms of Pigouvian taxes: first, second or third best. First-best taxes are 
designed to achieve an ‘optimal’ level of pollution, so that the marginal costs of measures to 
restrict pollution is equal to the marginal benefits that result from them. They seek to balance 
these costs and benefits optimally across society. All carbon emissions could be eliminated of 
course. The fact that this does not happen is because of the benefits – i.e. employment and 
incomes – created by the activities producing the emissions.  
In practice, first-best taxes remain an abstract ideal rather than a reality (Sterner, 2003). In 
most cases the informational requirements to calculate marginal social benefits8 and cost 
curves are prohibitively high as the basis for practical policy. Furthermore, there is uncertainty 
about future social costs and benefits.  
Second-best taxes do not seek to estimate marginal social benefits, but rather determine a 
limit on an activity, and calibrate taxes to achieve the required reduction in the activity. 
Importantly, this relates directly to the pollutant. The aim will thus be to reduce airborne 
pollutants by taxing producers by volume of emission. With respect to fossil fuels, this would 
tax CO2 emissions directly.  
A number of countries use, or have used, second-best taxes of this kind for other forms of 




 It may be more equitable to tax consumption rather than production. Industrialised countries have increasingly 
moved environmentally sensitive production to developing countries, or have purchased carbon-intensive products 
from producers in developing countries. Taxing production penalises these countries, whereas a tax on consumption 
would see the incidence of the tax fall on the source of demand and the end-users.  
8
 This requires the calculation of people’s valuation of non-traded, environmental goods. Two approaches are 
commonly used. Hedonic pricing estimates people’s valuations through the prices of related goods, and is therefore a 
form of indirect revealed preference. Contingent valuations ask people directly about their valuations, often within a 
‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) or ‘willingness to accept’ (WTA) framework.  
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use of a symmetrical tax/subsidy framework, which was also revenue-neutral. The tax rate 
applied depends on the level of efficiency of the producer with respect to NOx emissions. If 
efficiency is average, the rate is zero; if below average it becomes sharply positive; if above 
average it turns negative, and the producer receives a subsidy. Penalties applied to ‘bad’ 
performers are therefore used to subsidise good performers.  
Countries have yet to apply a framework of this kind directly to CO2 emissions. The closest is 
to tax products in relation to their CO2 content, which many countries have done.
9 Where this 
is directly related to CO2 content (i.e. tax rates vary in proportion to products’ CO2 emissions) 
it is essentially a second-best Pigouvian tax. Where it is applied to a product associated with 
CO2 emissions, but not directly related to the level of emissions, it is a third-best form of 
taxation. 
The most obvious examples are taxes on fuel. Most countries use fuel taxes to some extent, 
and revenues from these forms of taxation account for 60%–70% of environmental tax 
receipts globally. Rates vary enormously, however, as shown Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Petrol Taxes $US cent/litre, 2008 
 
Source: Sterner, 2011 
Revenues from fuel tax are high because fuel is price-inelastic. Over the longer term, however, 
elasticity increases, particularly when the availability of substitutes (e.g. public transport) is 
enhanced. Sterner (2011) estimates that if European economies had applied the same rates of 
tax as the USA in recent decades, demand for fuel would be a third higher than it is now.  
The point is that fuel taxes can reduce fuel demand, but they need to be high and kept in place 
for long periods to achieve this. The same is true of levies on the industrial use of fuel, which 
will incentivise greater efficiency over time. This is not the same as reducing total usage, or 
the resultant greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions, however. For this, efficiency gains have to 
outstrip the rate of economic growth, and there has to be a progressive transfer to non-
polluting forms of energy throughout the economy. As we have seen, this has cost 
implications, and so is likely to require carrots as well as sticks – subsidies as well as taxes. 
Unlike taxes (that have the advantage of generating public revenues), subsidies come at a 
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complementary taxes, with no fiscal implications. Even here, however, the cost falls squarely 
on the economy in question. From a development perspective, this may be unfair. The reason 
why there is a need to make the transition to green growth is because of the accelerating 
problem of climate change. This, in turn, is largely the result of the historical accumulation of 
CO2 in the atmosphere caused by the industrialisation of today’s developed countries. During 
their development process, they freely exploited the energy contained in fossil fuels. The 
wealth that developed countries enjoy today can be seen, in no small part, as the 
accumulation of physical capital (wealth) at the cost of the deterioration of another form of 
capital (i.e. the natural capital10 represented by a sustainable environment).  
While it can be argued that some middle-income countries (MICs) have also contributed to this 
problem, and will increasingly do so, this is not the case with LICs. Consequently, it is 
unreasonable to expect them to adopt measures that will negatively affect their own 
development prospects because of factors for which they bear no responsibility.  
As many developed countries are discovering, however, decoupling economic growth from GhG 
emissions is extremely hard, even in relative terms. Worryingly, there is no evidence to date of 
absolute decoupling – where GDP growth does not result in higher CO2 emissions. Companies 
that pay carbon taxes may be put at a disadvantage when competing internationally, and on a 
macro scale countries that generate a large part of their energy from renewable sources would 
also tend to face higher costs. 
Figure 2.2 Renewable Energy as % of Total Energy Consumption, 2008 vs. 2020 
 
Source: Eurostat 
No country, even those with very strong support for environmental sustainability, envisages a 
wholesale shift towards renewable energy in the foreseeable future. As shown in Figure 2.2, 
just 10% of the EU-27’s energy consumption is currently from renewable sources, and this is 




 ‘Natural capital is the extension of the economic notion of capital (manufactured means of production) to 
environmental goods and services. A functional definition of capital in general is: "a stock that yields a flow of valuable 
goods or services into the future". Natural capital is thus the stock of natural ecosystems that yields a flow of valuable 
ecosystem goods or services into the future. For example, a stock of trees or fish provides a flow of new trees or fish, 
a flow which can be sustainable indefinitely. Natural capital may also provide services like recycling wastes or water 
catchment and erosion control. Since the flow of services from ecosystems requires that they function as whole 
systems, the structure and diversity of the system are important components of natural capital.’ (Costanza and 
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costs. If LICs are to develop renewable energy capacity, the additional costs incurred should 
be met from external funds. Below we provide some details on current and potential 
mechanisms to fulfil this role. 
2.1.2 Lower the costs of renewables 
If the aim of Pigouvian taxes on fossil fuels is to encourage a switch towards renewable 
energy, providing subsidies for renewable energy performs the same function by altering 
relative prices. In theory, a well-calibrated Pigouvian tax on CO2 emissions (second best), or 
on fossil fuels (third best), would be sufficient to stimulate non-fossil-fuel forms of energy, 
such as renewables (Petrakis et al., 1997). In their absence, however, many countries have 
chosen to subsidise the renewable sector directly, with a particular aim of spurring R&D, 
innovation and the reduction of unit costs. With learning spillovers, optimal outcomes are 
approximated with two forms of subsidy: one on outputs, and the other at the market-entry or 
investment point (Bläsi and Requate, 2005). 
There are a number of ways to deliver subsidies, all of which reduce the direct or indirect cost. 
First, grants may be made to subsidise capital expenditure. Second, loans may be provided at 
concessional rates, either directly or as part of a ‘blended finance’ model. Third, the 
creditworthiness of the borrower may be enhanced through providing some forms of 
guarantee. In relation to the optimal subsidy models suggested by Bläsi and Requate (2005), 
these mechanisms lower entry barriers to the sector and make financing more accessible and 
affordable.  
For example, UNEP’s Rural Energy Enterprise Development (REED)11 seeks to lower entry 
barriers by providing seed capital for entrepreneurs in renewable energy in developing 
countries. REED focuses on small-scale, innovative projects, which would be unlikely to attract 
commercial funding, but have significant potential for scalability. A project with similar aims, 
which operates across Asia and Africa, is the Seed Capital Assistance Facility (SCAF).12 Instead 
of working directly with entrepreneurs, SCAF assists energy-investment funds to provide seed 
financing for clean energy enterprises and projects. UNEP partners with the African and Asian 
Development Banks as part of the SCAF project.  
2.1.3 Boost the returns from renewables 
The favoured mechanism to boost the returns of renewable energy providers has been the 
feed-in tariff (FIT). With a FIT, producers of electricity from renewable sources are paid a 
guaranteed premium over fossil-fuel producers. As the idea is to spur innovation and create 
knowledge spillovers, FITs are generally designed to decline over time as the knowledge 
benefits are generated and diffused, and the unit cost of renewable energy becomes 
competitive with fossil fuels. Following their introduction in Germany, numerous developed 
countries now have FITs in place. They have also become increasingly common in developing 
countries, with a number of countries having implemented a FIT, or planning to do so (e.g. 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa). 
While the goals of FITs are the same in developed and developing countries, there are 
particular features of the latter that require consideration. For example, FITs in developed 
countries are generally funded by a premium placed on all energy bills. Following the logic set 
out above, in developing countries this could be covered by external finance from donors, 





 Information available at: http://www.uneptie.org/energy/activities/reed/  
12
 Information available at: http://www.uneptie.org/energy/activities/scaf/  
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2.2 Mechanisms to increase the supply of appropriate finance 
There are many different forms of finance, and some are more suited than others to financing 
renewable energy. Even when the basic economics and returns are attractive enough, the 
most important characteristic is that the finance be long term. Investment in renewable energy 
can take years, or even decades, to yield good returns. What is needed, therefore, is ‘patient 
capital’, which is relatively hard to obtain, given typical short-term horizons of private capital 
markets.  
An important element here is that large funds that have long-term liabilities (such as sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) and/or pension funds) should become a more significant source of long-
term investment in renewables. 
A relatively high-profile initiative in this area was launched by the Johannesburg Renewable 
Energy Coalition (JREC),13 a group of 88 countries formed in the wake of the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development. The JREC established the ‘Patient Capital Initiative’,14 
which in turn led to the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF).15 
GEEREF is a fund structure, which provides capital to renewable energy funds operating in 
developing countries, which: 
…aims to accelerate the transfer, development, use and enforcement of environmentally 
sound technologies for the world's poorer regions, helping to bring secure, clean and 
affordable energy to local people. (GEEREF website)16  
With founding investment from the EU, Germany and Norway, GEEREF has attracted half of its 
target funding of US$200 million, and is particularly focused on attracting institutional 
investors.  
In its investments: ‘Priority is given to investment in countries with policies and regulatory 
frameworks on energy efficiency and renewable energy’. Once again, this raises the question 
of who should be bearing these costs. We have argued that the cost of feed-in tariffs in LICs 
should be borne by the donor community rather than the countries themselves. It is not clear 
that GEEREF adopts this approach, but may instead be incentivising countries to put in place 
mechanisms that impose an economic cost.  
2.2.1 Green bonds 
A mechanism that has attracted increasing interest is Green Bonds. In terms of demand, 
Green Bonds are particularly appealing to Socially Responsible Investors (SRIs) that give 
priority to mitigating climate change. As long as the instrument can deliver a market-level 
return, mainstream institutional investors and SWFs are also now considering similar types of 
investment.  
In addition to its traditional financing on the international capital markets, the EIB developed 
an innovative instrument to raise funds for green investment, which it finances itself. This 
helps develop a new Green Bond instrument (and give it liquidity), which could then be issued 
by other entities, either public or private. Since 2007, the EIB has issued € 1.4 billion 
(including € 0.5 billion in 2010 – Source: Interview material and EIB Annual Reports) of 
‘Climate Awareness Bonds’, which are ring-fenced finance raised for the EIB's future lending to 
projects supporting climate action in the fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency, both 
within the EU and in developing countries.  
The EIB has issued Climate Awareness Bonds through ten issues in six currencies, thus acting 




 Information available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/jrec/about_en.htm  
14
 Information available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/jrec/pdf/pci_summary_brochure_final.pdf  
15
 Information available at: http://www.geeref.com/pages/home 
16
 Information available at: http://geeref.com/posts/display/1  
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corporate responsibility in relation to the environment, thus giving confidence to SRIs. The 
issuance of these bonds sets a valuable precedent for broader use of this and other similar 
instruments, particularly by international, regional and national public development banks, 
which would use the funds to finance private green investment. In the future private investors 
could themselves directly issue the instruments, but this is unlikely to be feasible for some 
time.  
A key part of the attractiveness of Green Bonds is their backing by credible institutions, which 
are themselves backed by sovereign states. Risks are thus effectively underwritten, enabling 
the bonds to be packaged as safe instruments for institutional investors. Were they to be 
issued by private investors, the bonds’ ratings would obviously be lower, reflecting the fact 
that risks were no longer borne by a publicly backed body. The market would need to be more 
liquid, and its uncertainty lower, before private Green Bonds would be attractive to institutional 
investors.  
Following the EIB’s lead, the World Bank also began issuing Green Bonds in 2008. Since then, 
US$2 billion has been raised through the sale of AAA-rated bonds in 15 different currencies to 
fixed-income investors,17 with the proceeds used for climate-change mitigation or adaptation 
projects in developing countries. Specifically, the Bank looks to invest in projects in the 
following areas:18 
 Solar and wind installations 
 Funding for new technologies that permit significant reductions in GhG emissions 
 Rehabilitation of power plants and transmission facilities to reduce GhG emissions 
 Greater efficiency in transport, including fuel switching and mass transport 
 Waste management (methane emissions) and construction of energy-efficient 
buildings 
 Carbon reduction through reforestation and avoided deforestation 
Coupons are compatible with their AAA status, ranging from 0.875% for 125 million Japanese 
Yen in 2010 to 10% for 50 million Turkish Lira denominated bond, again in 2010. By attracting 
institutional, fixed-income investors, Green Bonds have demonstrated significant potential to 
raise large quantities of relatively long-term finance. Despite their potential, however, they 
remain a niche product, as the rather small list of World Bank investors illustrates.  
Supply is likely to elicit demand, particularly where bonds are backed by credible international 
institutions. This requires them to shoulder some possible risk, but their willingness (or not) to 
do so will send a clear signal to investors about the long-term viability of the markets in 
question. It is useful to remember that DFIs helped develop local currency bond markets in 
emerging and developing countries, a valuable precedent. Without such a credible signal, 
investors may not provide capital on the scale needed to develop the infrastructure for 
renewable energy. If confidence can be created, however, global capital markets could become 
a valuable source of investment in renewable energy in developing countries.  
By issuing such bonds, international institutions, or donor governments, can play a very 
valuable market-making role, especially for LICs. In less developed countries (LICs and Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs)), risks may be considerably higher and returns may be more 
uncertain. The impact, in terms of reduced global carbon emissions, may be higher for LICs, 
for example, than for developed economies, since the cost of investing in renewables is often 




 To date, the US$ investors are: California State Treasurer’s Office; CALSTERS; MMA Praxis Mutual Funds; New York 
Common Retirement Fund; Sarasin; SEB Ethos rantefund; SEB Trygg Liv; Second Swedish National Pension Fund 
(AP2); Third Swedish National Pension Fund (AP3); Trillium Asset Management; UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. Investors 
in other currencies are: Adlerbert Research Foundation; AP2 – Second Swedish National Pension Fund; AP3 – Third 
Swedish National Pension Fund; LF Liv; MISTRA; Nikko Asset Management; Skandia Liv 
18
 Information available at: http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/WorldBank_GreenBondFactsheet.pdf  
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Issuing Green Bonds to fund renewables investment in developed countries is also valuable for 
developing countries, as deepening and making such a market more liquid would facilitate 
issuance for investment. An interesting question is whether such issuance could be extended 
also to Regional Development Banks, like the African Development Bank (AfDB). 
2.2.2 Other types of bond 
The most straightforward and possibly cheapest option would be to raise finance using straight 
government (or institutional) bonds, and earmark the revenues for renewable energy projects 
in developing countries as bilateral or multilateral concessional or non-concessional lending. 
This already happens to a certain extent, but is limited by fiscal constraints and the desire to 
tap alternative – climate-aware – investors.  
An intermediate option would be an indexed bond where the coupon is linked to an indicator 
such as the price of carbon or levels of emissions. The crucial point is that yields are inversely 
linked to progress on mitigating climate change, which offers investors a hedge against 
inaction. As this paper has highlighted, a major obstacle to achieving a change in investment is 
uncertainty surrounding future climate regimes. Indexed bonds that pay a higher return as 
carbon emissions fail to fall (or carbon prices remain too low) provide a hedge for investors, 
making it easier for them to invest in renewable energy projects, or other investments 
dependent upon progress on mitigating climate change.19 The proposal has been largely 
associated with climate-change mitigation in developed countries, but is potentially applicable 
to the developing world. In line with the framework sketched out above, it would require bonds 
to be issued in one jurisdiction (the UK, for example), with coupon payments linked to the 
mitigation of emissions in a developing country. This would provide investors in renewable 
energy in those countries with a hedge against future policy inaction that put their investments 
at risk, but the risks would be borne by the donor country where the bond was issued.  
Another potential structure is energy efficiency bonds. Developed in the USA as Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE)20 bonds, the instrument enables residential and commercial 
property owners to borrow money from municipal bodies to make energy-efficiency 
improvements to their properties. The financing is provided by the issuance of bonds, where 
payments are met by the borrowers using the revenues saved through efficiency gains. 
Alternatively, energy suppliers may issue the bonds and finance household and commercial 
property owners that undertake such investments. Public utility providers (still common in 
many developing countries) may be asked by governments to do so, but incentives would be 
necessary for private providers to take on such a role, for example through strict energy-
efficiency targets set by regulatory authorities.  
Energy efficiency bonds are thus an example of a win-win instrument. If applied to developing 
countries, there would be no need for financial transfers from the donor community as the 
bonds are self-financing and the changes they enable (i.e. more efficient use of energy) are 
clearly beneficial to the countries concerned. However, international bond financing backed by 
multilateral development banks may be necessary for countries that lack adequately developed 
domestic bond markets.  
Importantly, the potential of such bonds in developing countries is greater than in the 
developed world because of greater inefficiencies in energy use, as well as lower cost per unit 
of carbon saving. To leverage finance, however, energy efficiency bonds need to be credibly 
secured. In the US version, they are backed by the property in question – with seniority over 
mortgage payments. Adapting the mechanism to developing countries would require a similar 
level or surety, which could be difficult, though not impossible, to achieve. Institutions like the 
World Bank or the EIB could help to establish them in developing countries, where this is 
desirable. If the utility provider gives the financing to the users, however, the problem largely 




 The proposal has been supported by inter alia, the Aldersgate Group (http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/) and the 
London Accord (http://www.longfinance.net/programmes/london-accord.html).  
20
 Information available at: http://pacenow.org  
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financing must continue to use the utility company that provided it – in fact, in many cases, 
there may be no alternative provider anyway. 
2.2.3 Concessional finance 
Investment in renewable energy in developing countries requires long-term, patient capital. 
Unfortunately, however, this is precisely the type of investment that is most difficult to attract 
to developing countries. Even where the economics are more straightforward than in the 
renewable sector, international investors often respond to perceived riskiness of investment in 
LICs by (a) requiring a high rate of return and (b) only making relatively short-term finance 
available.  
This is a problem in the infrastructure sector generally. In Africa, the World Bank estimates 
that an additional US$48 billion per year would be needed to fill the infrastructure-spending 
gap (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, 2010), but in 2008 the maximum private investment that 
has been attracted was a little over US$12 billion. If mature infrastructure sectors cannot raise 
the finance needed, it is unsurprising that infrastructure for renewable energy suffers similar 
problems.  
A part of the solution to both general and renewable energy infrastructure is the involvement 
of DFIs, including Regional Development Banks.21 In large part because of their backing by 
sovereign states, DFIs are able to provide finance at maturities that the private sector cannot. 
In a recent systematic review on DFI ‘additionality’, Spratt and Ryan-Collins (2012: 2) 
conclude that:  
DFIs are able to: a) supply long-term finance, which is often essential for infrastructure 
but frequently unavailable in LICs; b) mitigate project risk, particularly in the early 
stages, thus leveraging additional finance by improving the attractiveness of deals 
(again, this is often crucial in LICs); and c) provide and leverage finance counter-
cyclically, either lending when private investors will not, or retaining positions when the 
private sector would pull out. 
Figure 2.3 DFI Investment in Renewable Energy, 2007-10 
 




 For an early review of the difficulties of purely private finance to fund infrastructure, and the desirability of public 
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Figure 2.3 illustrates that this is also the case in the renewable energy infrastructure, where 
DFI investments grew significantly between 2007 and 2010. As well as the provision of finance 
of longer maturities, DFIs are more able to act counter-cyclically, as evidenced by the sharp 
increase in their activities in renewable energy, as well as more generally, in the wake of the 
2008 global financial crisis (see, for example, Ocampo, Griffith-Jones et al., 2010, for the 
latter).  
As well as the favourable access to finance DFIs bring,22 most of them can provide a ‘political 
umbrella’ whereby investors have confidence that they will be protected from default risk. The 
logic is straightforward: investors assume that borrowers are far less likely to default if a DFI 
from a donor country, or an international institution, is involved, as the borrower will not want 
to jeopardise their broader relationship. The logic is also correct: the IFC, for example, has 
never been part of a debt-rescheduling process and payments have never been permanently 
affected in a general default (Moody’s, 2007).  
As well as default risk, DFI participation provides assurances that governments will honour the 
terms of contracts. While this is important in the infrastructure sector generally, where stable 
and supportive regulatory structures are key, it is even more so in the renewable energy 
sector, where the maintenance of price mechanisms such as FITs may be essential to ensure 
the economic viability of a project.  
In this regard, one of the most straightforward and effective ways to catalyse investment in 
renewable energy in developing countries would be to increase the resources available to DFIs 
for this purpose.23 
2.2.4 Cornerstone and Challenge Funds 
A number of innovative partnership models with DFIs and investors have been proposed. As 
with Green Bonds, the aim is to attract institutional investors into the renewable energy sector. 
Recognising that institutional investors operate at a scale far above that of individual projects, 
and require a minimum level of liquidity to invest, fund-of-fund structures may be appropriate 
(Vivid Economics, 2009).  
Proposals also recognise the need to get the economics right, as discussed above. In this 
regard, a range of Public Finance Mechanisms (PFMs) could be made available to the fund-of-
funds, where DFIs and institutional investors would co-invest. 
Two options have been suggested:  
a. Cornerstone funds 
b. Challenge funds  
In both cases the fund-of-funds would have access to PFMs. In the case of Cornerstone Funds, 
these would be negotiated between the DFI and investors. For the Challenge Funds, 
institutional investors would compete for access to the PFMs. These two options are illustrated 





 For example, by acting as the ‘lender of record’ in its B-Loan programme, the IFC is able to provide finance to its 
co-investors on the same favourable terms that it itself enjoys.  
23
 In order to fulfil their potential, however, alterations to the financing structure and mandates of some DFIs may be 
needed. See Spratt and Ryan-Collins (forthcoming) for details.  
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Figure 2.4 Key role of PFMs in supporting low-carbon funds 
 
Source: UNEP and Partners/Vivid Economics 
For the PFMs, five are identified, corresponding with five risks facing institutional investors: 
1. Country risk guarantees to protect investors from country-specific risks that may arise in 
the context of a developing country  
2. ‘Low carbon policy risk cover’ could be offered as insurance against the prospects of 
developing country governments discontinuing support policies (such as FITs, for 
example) 
3. Foreign exchange hedging products, to insure against currency risk 
4. Low-carbon project development companies established to ensure a flow of projects for 
the fund-of-funds to invest in. Funds would absorb early-stage project-development 
risks, bringing them to an investable stage.24 
5. Public-sector risk assumption. The taking of ‘first-loss’ equity positions by the public 
sector helps institutional investors overcome issues such limited time for due diligence 
on multiple potential projects.  
2.2.5 Mobilising Sovereign Fund and institutional investors’ assets 
Combined with the fund-of-fund structure, and the co-investing role of DFIs, the PFMs are 
designed to make it possible for institutional investors (and sovereign wealth funds) to channel 
funds to the renewable energy sectors of developing countries. As well as being long-term 
investors, the primary reason is the scale of assets under management. European institutional 
investors, particularly pension funds and insurance companies, are estimated to control up to 
US$12 trillion, and sovereign wealth funds another US$4.3 trillion (Source, Sovereign Wealth 
Institute, 2011, for the latter). If a relatively small proportion of this could be allocated to the 
renewable energy sectors of developing countries, the funding shortfall could be met.  
As pointed out, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) hold a total of US$4.3 trillion of assets; if 1% 
of those assets were invested in renewable energy in developing countries, this would equate 




 This corresponds with the InfraCo model established by the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) as 
InfraCo Africa and InfraCo Asia. http://www.infraco.com/  
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capital to annual loans was applied as that of the Latin American Development Bank (CAF, 
based on its legal name, Corporación Andina de Fomento), US$102 billion could be lent 
annually.25  
Furthermore, if the same principle and mechanism were applied to investing a further 1% of 
European institutional investors’ assets (reaching US$12 trillion dollars) in the paid-in capital of 
Development Banks, whether the World Bank or Regional Development Banks, then the 
potential for lending for renewables could go up to around US$400 billion annually. This could 
significantly increase the funding available for green investment. 
While this is attractive in principle, it clearly is not going to happen without complementary 
measures. For example, SWFs and institutional investors require commercial returns on their 
investments. Given the issues of commercial viability discussed above, this suggests the need 
for a ‘blended finance’ approach, perhaps in conjunction with DFIs.26 Under such a mechanism, 
grants could be blended with commercial lending, generating a market-level return and 
allowing the impact of grants to be leveraged.  
A related option could be to supplement or replace funds from grants to subsidise lending by 
DFIs by funding from innovative sources of finance; a potential carbon tax may be the most 
appropriate, but a financial transaction tax would also be a possibility (see also Noman, 2011). 
2.3 Mechanisms to reduce uncertainty 
This paper has discussed a number of the PFMs that are designed to reduce uncertainty.  
Three main types of mechanisms are used. First, as described above, institutions can be 
employed to absorb initial project risk, taking projects to the stage where they may be 
attractive to international investors. Second, guarantees may be offered in a variety of areas. 
Prices, for example, may be fixed within a necessary band to guarantee profitability, or loans 
may be guaranteed by a public body. In the latter case, the resulting credit enhancement 
eliminates uncertainty over repayment, enabling the borrower to obtain finance on better 
terms. Third, insurance may be provided to protect investors from a range of potential events 
that could derail a project. This could be used to offset uncertainty over the maintenance of 
particular policies, or it could be related to price. 
In their different ways, these mechanisms reduce the level of risk, making projects more 
affordable and their economics more viable. Renewable energy projects are highly dependent 
upon a small number of factors which are not economic variables, however, but driven by 
policy – the maintenance of a FIT, or the implementation of a carbon tax, for example. 
However, these factors are inherently uncertain, particularly given the potential economic 
costs involved. Importantly, in virtually all cases, such mechanisms are considered temporary. 
The assumption is that, in time, they will no longer be necessary as global and national 
conditions evolve to become increasingly supportive of renewable energy.  
To return to the economics of the sector, the hope and expectation is that this will steadily 
improve until renewable energy is genuinely competitive with fossil fuels, at which point 
supporting instruments will no longer be required. There are two routes to this outcome. First, 
the price of fossil fuels increases, due to rising demand and dwindling supply, and/or increased 
Pigouvian taxes. Second, the unit costs of renewable energy fall, due to the diffusion of 
technological advances and the exploitation of economies of scale. Neither of the two is a 
certain outcome, however. 
SEFI (2008) suggests that PFMs of the kind being reviewed here can leverage private finance 
with ratios of between 3 and 15:1. As a transitional means of developing a competitive 
industry, this is a very sensible investment. If the industry does not become competitive, 




 For a more detailed rationale for these calculations, see Griffith-Jones (2011).  
26
 Regional Development Banks would be particularly appropriate for regional schemes of renewable energy. 
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leverage ratio is that public funds are providing a return on the private finance invested. Using 
these ratios, this has been between 6% and 30%. As long as public money is available to 
provide this function, it will always be possible to elicit private funds, but this is clearly not 
sustainable in fiscal terms over the longer term. Furthermore, the global financial crisis has 
taught us that excessive leverage can be dangerous, if not properly monitored. 
2.3.1 Guarantees linked to taxes 
Given uncertainties surrounding the long-term price of oil and gas, as well as high volatility, 
one interesting potential policy tool could be to introduce a variable tax on the price of oil, that 
would increase as the price fell below a given level, and decrease as the price of oil increased 
beyond this level. As a result, the market price of oil would be stabilised and the profitability of 
investment in renewables made less uncertain. This is distinct from a Pigouvian tax on oil, 
which would not provide a floor for the price.  
This tax/guarantee would also generate revenue for governments, which could be used to 
finance other investment in preventing or mitigating climate change; alternatively, it could be 
used to reduce government debt and deficits. Guarantees of a floor on the price of oil and gas 
may be a valuable mechanism for enhancing flows to low-carbon investment, particularly in 
developing countries that are going through or emerging from a credit-rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981) process.  
Another way to protect the relative price of renewables is through the creation of a floor on the 
price of carbon. As with oil, however, to be feasible this would need to be achieved through the 
use of variable taxes. Renewable energy facilities – as well as other emission-mitigating 
mechanisms – may be designed with a carbon market in mind, particularly the ability to create 
and sell carbon credits into these markets. The project economics, however, may rest upon a 
minimum price being received for these credits. Implicit guarantees, achieved through the use 
of variable taxes, are one way of doing this.  
Alternatively, a put option could be provided, which is triggered once the price falls below a 
certain level. The public sector provides project investors with the put contract, guaranteeing 
to buy the carbon credits at a specified price on a given date, thus eliminating price 
uncertainty. Unlike the variable tax approach, however, the open-ended commitments that 
providing such a put option would imply make this unrealistic as a real-world policy tool.  
While not using an option mechanism, the UK became the first country to announce a floor 
price on carbon in the 2011 budget.27 Starting in 2013, the price will steadily increase, with the 
aim being to provide certainty for investors and producers. As will be discussed in the next 
section, this mechanism is designed to do the job envisaged for the global carbon market. The 
European Trading System (ETS) is the only component of a global system that is functioning, 
but the UK move reflects concern that the prices generated are not high enough to produce 
sufficient incentives.  
A different option is to design a liquidity facility (which could be part of a broader stabilisation 
fund) to help overcome the inability to obtain sufficient finance to support ongoing investment, 
if the investment in the renewable becomes unprofitable due to a fall in the price of oil or gas. 
Such a facility could provide the necessary financing on a temporary basis. Furthermore, 
where the investment in a project in renewables was already completed, but the price of oil or 
gas fell significantly, then a public liquidity facility could provide temporary credit, which could 
help keep the project functioning. Precedents already exist for this latter mechanism. 
One of the main reasons why the profitability of low-carbon investment is uncertain is lack of 
knowledge over the future trajectory of oil or gas prices. Liquidity facilities could be used to 
deal with at least part of that risk. The conceptual operationalisation of a liquidity facility is 
relatively simple. The parties involved first agree upon a ‘floor value’ as the project’s minimum 




 Information available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consult_carbon_price_support.htm  
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value, it is important that there is sufficient margin for deviations in the operational 
performance from the initially projected levels. In the event of a major fall in the price of oil or 
gas, which results in the inability of the project to repay its debts – where the cash-generation 
becomes insufficient to reach the floor value – the liquidity facility is temporarily drawn upon. 
A loan is made to the project’s senior lenders to be paid back when the project’s cash flow 
allows. It is presumed this will happen when oil or gas prices rise. Price, availability and size of 
a liquidity facility would depend on estimates based on the historical fluctuations of the real 
price of oil.  
Only one project to date has implemented this policy mechanism, which is located in Brazil and 
focused on infrastructure: AES Tiete. In the context of infrastructure financing, however, there 
are precedents for similar liquidity facilities in a somewhat different context, through currency 
devaluation risk. Some precedent exists in the IFC Contingent Partial Credit Guarantees, which 
are liquidity facilities for US dollars and local currency financing. The trigger for its use is a 
major devaluation in the project’s host country. This guarantee is usually provided for two 
years, which the IFC estimates as sufficient for the project to recover from an economic 
downturn and be able to raise tariffs or prices sufficiently. In the case of a liquidity facility 
linked to oil or gas prices, the period may need to be somewhat longer, in view of the cycle of 
oil and gas prices. 
Relatively long tenors make liquidity facilities particularly suitable for renewable financing. At 
the same time the long useful life of assets in such projects is a solid basis for debt 
repayments, allowing for such a liquidity facility to be viable. The liquidity facility has a 
counter-cyclical element, as the project continues without a problem in the face of external 
shocks, such as devaluation for the existing IFC facility, which could be applied to a drop in the 
price of oil or gas for renewable energy projects. 
The current crisis also opens up potential opportunities for modifying private lending and 
investing practices, especially (but not only) where governments are playing some role as 
shareholders. Regarding banks, it could be mandated by their regulators that a minimum (e.g. 
5%) of lending must be allocated towards low-carbon technology, half of which should be 
carried out in developing countries. As pointed out, the implementation could be facilitated for 
commercial banks, where governments are important shareholders (including those which 
were bailed out during the 2008 crisis). 
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3 International transfer mechanisms and 
concluding comments 
All the mechanisms considered in this paper, or any that could be reasonably envisaged, will 
entail some costs. An important issue, therefore, is that of cost effectiveness: how much 
private investment in renewable energy can be leveraged for a given level of public support? 
What are the most cost-effective mechanisms in different circumstances of doing so? We thus 
need to consider both the mechanisms, and who should pay for them.  
For the latter, we have argued that the cost of financing renewable energy in developing 
countries, particularly LICs, should be met by developed economies. While this could be done 
bilaterally – and some countries have made considerable efforts in this regard – a number of 
international transfer mechanisms already exist. The most significant of these relate to the 
Kyoto Protocol, where (Annex 1) developed countries could count the mitigation of emissions 
in developing countries towards their own emission-reduction obligations. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established under Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The CDM allows Annex 1 countries to contribute to their emission-reduction targets 
by obtaining Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) in non-Annex 1 countries. The aim is to 
reduce global emissions where it is most efficient (cheapest) to do so, and to facilitate low-
carbon development in poorer countries. Under CDM, if a project is approved, companies (from 
Annex 1) receive CERs, which they can trade/sell through mechanisms such as the ETS. From 
its inception in 2001 to 2012, the CDM is forecast to reduce 1.5 billion tons of CO2 emissions. 
Figure 3.1 Registered project activities by host party. Total: 2,453 
 
Source: UNFCCC, 2010 
Figure 3.1 shows the geographical distribution of CDM projects up to 2010. As can be seen, the 
overwhelming majority are accounted for by large emerging economies, particularly China and 
India. The CDM has been criticised for favouring large countries with existing, inefficient 
industry,28 rather than smaller economies, particularly in Africa. Until recently, the CDM has 
been ill suited to smaller renewable energy projects in poorer countries. The 2010 CDM Annual 
Report (UNFCCC, 2010) proposes a number of approaches to address these issues, including 
the bundling of projects to ease the bureaucratic process.  
Another criticism of the CDM has been its failure to include deforestation, which is responsible 




 For example, 20% of CDM projects since its inception were for destroying HFC-23 (11,700 times more potent as a 
GhG than CO2) emitted while making the refrigerant HCFC-22.  
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from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD).29 REDD was designed to ascribe a value to 
the carbon content of forests and their role as carbon sinks, whereby payments would be made 
to developing countries to preserve their stock of forests and maintain ecosystem services. 
REDD+ extended the framework to include the possibility of payments for ‘sustainable forest 
management’, forest conservation and afforestation (i.e. increasing forest stocks). One of the 
few successes to emerge from COP15 at Copenhagen was the commitment of US$4.5 billion of 
‘fast start’ funding to REDD+ for the period 2010–12. It is estimated that up to US$30 billion 
per year may ultimately be transferred to developing countries through the REDD+ system. 
It remains to be seen how REDD+ will function in practice, but – as with the CDM – the 
growing supply of carbon credits needs demand. It was expected that the global carbon 
market would supply this demand. Developed – and perhaps emerging – economies would sign 
up for binding emission-reduction targets, and a global carbon market would be created for 
trading carbon credits (CERs). A binding deal to steadily reduce carbon emissions to 
sustainable levels would ensure a high demand for carbon credits, supporting the price of 
carbon. Furthermore, as the global carbon ‘cap’ becomes progressively tighter, the price of 
carbon would rise accordingly. In such as system, carbon credits from the CDM or REDD+ 
mechanisms would be increasingly valuable, providing strong incentives for investors to 
participate and ensuring a steady flow of financing to developing countries.  
Unfortunately, however, no global deal has been reached and the global carbon market does 
not exist. It remains to be seen if this situation will change, but for the present it is hard to see 
how sufficient funds will be generated to fund a major shift to renewable energy in developing 
countries, regardless of the mechanisms. In the absence of a carbon market to provide the 
correct incentives, this requires someone to bear the costs. The IEA (2009) estimates that the 
energy switch needed will cost US$10.5 trillion, half of which is needed in developing 
countries. Copenhagen saw commitments to transfer US$100 million per year to developing 
countries for climate-change mitigation and adaptation by 2020. As yet, the source of these 
funds is unspecified, though recommendations were produced in the Report of the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (2010).  
The Report proposed that: 
 Around US$30 billion annually could be allocated towards the $100 million target 
from taxes on the auctions of carbon allowances, and/or carbon taxes in developed 
countries. 
 Up to US$10 billion annually could be generated through redirecting fossil-fuel 
subsidies, or innovative instruments such as Financial Transaction Taxes (FTT). 
 A further US$10 billion could be raised from international shipping and aviation. 
 Around $11 billion of additional funds could be leveraged via DFIs. 
While members of the Advisory Group disagreed on whether private flows should count 
towards the US$100 billion target, it was suggested that a carbon price of US$20–US$25 per 
ton could generate between US$30 and US$50 billion in increased carbon market flows, though 
methodologies to make accurate estimates of these flows remain unproven.  
Even if private finance does count towards the target figure, however, it is still dependent on a 
sufficiently high carbon price, which requires a minimum level of demand for carbon credits. 
Unless the prospects of an equitable global carbon market can be revised, it is hard to see 
where this demand will come from.  
In this context, and given that the economics of renewable energy are not yet competitive with 
fossil fuels, there is little prospect that developing countries themselves will choose to hamper 
their own economic development with higher cost energy. In such conditions, the global switch 
to renewable energy, which everyone agrees is essential to avoid ‘dangerous’ and ‘runaway’ 
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The alternative way of correcting the issue of economic profitability would be to greatly expand 
the use of grants in ‘blended finance’ models as suggested above. If correctly structured, such 
mechanisms could generate a sufficiently high rate of return for long-term investors, both 
private and public, seeking commercial returns, potentially unlocking the trillions of assets 
controlled by institutional investors and sovereign wealth funds, as discussed above.  
This would need to be managed carefully to avoid creating perverse incentives. Furthermore, 
the scale of investment needed suggests that grant financing would have to be significantly 
expanded to have the required impact. The potential prize is great, however. It is perhaps only 
institutional investors and SWFs that have resources on the scale needed. Unlocking a 
proportion of these resources through the strategic use of public resources, using some of the 
mechanisms proposed in this paper, has the potential to make a real difference.  
We cannot just expect this to happen. Exhorting private investors to sharply increase their 
investments in (relatively) unprofitable activities that are also very risky is clearly not going to 
work. Somehow the attractiveness of these investments needs to be increased. This can be 
done by changing the underlying economics through functioning carbon markets, or through 
creating ‘synthetic’ returns in ‘blended finance’ models. Where there are costs associated with 
creating commercial incentives, we have argued here that low-income countries in particular 
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